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9 Q CYBER TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED

10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
11 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
12 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

13 APPLE INC.,

14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 NSO GROUP TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED,
17 and Q CYBER TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED,

18 Defendants.

Case No. 3:21-cv-09078-JD

**DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT IN
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
WITHOUT PREJUDICE**

*[Filed concurrently with the Declaration of
Joseph. N. Akrotirianakis]*

Hon. James Donato
Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
Date: October 24, 2024
Time: 10:00 a.m.

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 After three years of forcing Defendants NSO Group Technologies and Q Cyber
3 Technologies Limited (“Defendants”) to expend time and resources defending this lawsuit, and
4 after vigorously resisting two motions to dismiss (including one within the last 12 months),
5 Plaintiff Apple Inc. now moves to dismiss its own claims.

6 *First*, NSO agrees that this matter should be dismissed. NSO is an Israeli company that
7 produces (and, with the permission of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, licenses) lawful-intercept
8 technologies for government agencies to investigate crime and combat terrorism. These tools were
9 developed in large part as a countermeasure to “end to end” encryption (E2EE) technology and
10 similar technologies, which can be used by terrorists and in narcotics trafficking, human
11 trafficking, child exploitation, and other serious crimes. Companies that provide E2EE technology
12 and similar technologies have repeatedly refused to cooperate with law enforcement and
13 intelligence agencies to counter these threats, including Plaintiff. In contrast, NSO develops
14 lawful-intercept tools like Pegasus that are necessary for our world to be safer. And, NSO takes
15 care to ensure that its government customers use its technologies appropriately and in a manner
16 consistent with their own laws, including applicable privacy laws. NSO’s marketing and licensing
17 activities are vetted by its Business Ethics Committee (now its Governance, Risk and Compliance
18 Committee) and approved by the Government of Israel’s Ministry of Defense.

19 Regardless, NSO has consistently argued that the United States District Court for the
20 Northern District of California is not the appropriate forum for adjudicating claims that a foreign
21 technology company licensed lawful-intercept technology to foreign governments, which then
22 used the technology to monitor foreign criminals and terrorists in foreign countries for those
23 countries’ own national security and other sovereign interests. Apple’s own motion, which appears
24 to have been provided to the media before it was provided to the Court or to NSO,¹ concedes that

25
26 _____
27 ¹ According to the Notice of Electronic Filing, Apple filed its Motion to Dismiss at 9:06 AM
28 Pacific on September 13, 2024. (Akro Decl. ¶ 13.) Five minutes later, *The Washington Post*
published a fourteen-paragraph article on the motion that included third party quotations. (*See*
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/09/13/apple-lawsuit-nso-pegasus-spyware/.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/09/13/apple-lawsuit-nso-pegasus-spyware/))

1 litigating in this forum presents “significant obstacles”—a point that NSO made repeatedly in its
2 Rule 12 briefing to this Court.

3 *Second*, the dismissal should be with prejudice. This matter was filed nearly three years
4 ago. And yet, Apple has taken virtually no steps to prosecute its claims. At the same time, the
5 length of the litigation process alone has imposed substantial burdens on NSO. Apple’s motion
6 also does not adequately explain its decision to move for dismissal now, when it was aware months
7 ago of all the significant circumstances raised in its motion.

8 *Third*, should the Court decline to dismiss Apple’s claims with prejudice, it should
9 condition the dismissal without prejudice on an award to NSO for the costs and fees incurred for
10 work which would not be able to be used in any future litigation of Apple’s claims.

11 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

12 Plaintiff filed its Complaint on November 23, 2021, asserting various claims against NSO
13 in connection with its Pegasus technology—a lawful-intercept technology that NSO licenses to
14 government agencies for investigating serious crimes and combating terrorism. (*See* Dkt. No. 1;
15 Declaration of Joseph N. Akrotirianakis (“Akro Decl.”) ¶ 2.) NSO moved to dismiss the
16 Complaint on March 3, 2022, and its initial motion to dismiss was fully briefed as of May 18,
17 2022. (*Id.* ¶ 4.) NSO participated in the preparation of a Joint Case Management Statement, filed
18 on March 10, 2022, and the required conferencing of counsel, and counsel prepared for and
19 attended the Initial Case Management Conference on March 17, 2022. (*Id.* ¶ 5.)

20 The Court thereafter stayed this action until February 16, 2023, in order for the Supreme
21 Court to issue a decision on NSO’s petition for a writ of certiorari in *NSO Group Technologies*
22 *Limited et al. v. WhatsApp Inc. et al.*, No. 21-1338 (U.S.). (*See* Dkt. Nos. 34, 46.) After the stay
23 lifted, NSO filed a renewed motion to dismiss on March 10, 2023. (Akro Decl. ¶ 6.) Briefing in
24 connection with that motion was extended, and involved declarations, a proposed order, a reply
25 brief, supplemental briefing, numerous administrative motions, a statement of recent decision, and
26 a stipulated (non-discovery) protective order. (*See id.*) The Court denied NSO’s renewed motion
27 to dismiss on January 23, 2024, and NSO answered Apple’s Complaint on February 14, 2024. (*Id.*
28 ¶ 7.)

1 NSO then negotiated and prepared portions of a second Joint Case Management Statement,
2 which was filed on May 9, 2024, and served initial disclosures that same day. (*Id.* ¶ 8.) Counsel
3 for NSO then prepared for and attended a Case Management Conference with the Court on May
4 16, 2024. (*Id.*) After the Case Management Conference, the parties engaged in written discovery.
5 (*See id.* ¶¶ 9–10.)

6 On September 13, 2024, without meeting and conferring with NSO, Apple moved to
7 dismiss its own Complaint. (*Id.* ¶ 12; Dkt. No. 98, “Mot.”).

8 **III. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

9 NSO does not oppose Apple’s request to dismiss its Complaint.

10 The Court, however, should dismiss this action *with* prejudice, as it has the discretion to
11 do. *See WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three v. Spot Runner, Inc.*, 655 F.3d 1039, 1059 n.6 (9th Cir.
12 2011), *abrogated on other grounds by Lorenzo v. SEC*, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019); *see also Diamond*
13 *State Ins. Co. v. Genesis Ins. Co.*, 379 F. App’x 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s
14 conversion of plaintiff’s voluntary motion to dismiss *without* prejudice into motion to dismiss *with*
15 prejudice).

16 Apple contends that Defendants must demonstrate “legal prejudice” to avoid dismissal
17 *without* prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). (Mot. 4.) That assertion is belied by the plain text of the
18 rule, which expressly provides that voluntary dismissal shall be ordered only “on terms that the
19 court considers proper.” The rule further clarifies that dismissal with prejudice may be such a term
20 by stating that voluntary dismissal is without prejudice “[u]nless the order states otherwise.” Fed.
21 R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (emphasis added). “Pursuant to the rule, the Court must make three separate
22 determinations: (1) whether to allow dismissal; (2) whether the dismissal should be with or without
23 prejudice; and (3) what terms and conditions, if any, should be imposed.” *Williams v. Peralta*
24 *Cnty. Coll. Dist.*, 227 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2005). As detailed below, the Court should
25 exercise its discretion to dismiss this action *with prejudice*. If the Court is inclined to grant
26 dismissal *without* prejudice, that dismissal should be conditioned on Apple’s payment of NSO’s
27 costs and fees, to the extent they were incurred for work which would not be able to be used in any
28 future litigation of Apple’s claims.

1 ***The Court Should Dismiss this Action***

2 Again, NSO does not oppose Apple’s request for dismissal. Although a court may refuse
3 to allow dismissal “if the nonmoving party shows that it will suffer legal prejudice as a result of
4 the dismissal.” *Kurin, Inc. v. Magnolia Med. Techs., Inc.*, No. 21-55025, 2021 WL 5823707, at *2
5 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2021). NSO does not argue that dismissal, in and of itself, will result in legal
6 prejudice. To the contrary, NSO has repeatedly argued that it would be prejudiced by being forced
7 to litigate Apple’s claims in a forum where it was not able to present a complete defense. It is
8 therefore undisputed that this matter should be dismissed.

9 ***The Dismissal Should Be with Prejudice***

10 That dismissal, however, should be with prejudice. The Court has broad discretion to
11 determine the terms of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). *See Hargis v. Foster*, 312 F.3d 404, 412 (9th
12 Cir. 2002). A court “may require that the dismissal be with prejudice,” even if a plaintiff requested
13 dismissal without prejudice. *Id.*; *see also Microhits, Inc. v. Deep Dish Prods. Inc.*, 510 F. App’x
14 611, 612 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When granting a motion for voluntary dismissal, a district court may
15 impose ‘terms that [it] considers proper,’ . . . includ[ing] that the dismissal be with prejudice.”).
16 In determining whether Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal should be with or without prejudice, courts
17 consider: “(1) the defendant’s effort and expense involved in preparing for trial; (2) excessive
18 delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the action; and (3) insufficient
19 explanation of the need to dismiss.” *Huynh v. Quora, Inc.*, 2020 WL 4584198, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
20 Aug. 10, 2020) (citations omitted).

21 Defendants have put forth significant effort and expense in this litigation, meriting
22 dismissal with prejudice. *See Toyo Tire & Rubber Co. v. Doublestar Dong Feng Tyre Co.*, 2018
23 WL 1896310, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018) (dismissal with prejudice when defendant had
24 “invested substantial resources into litigating” the claims and “th[e] litigation ha[d] been pending
25 for three years”). While courts have granted motions for voluntary dismissal without prejudice in
26 cases where “no motions challenging the merits of this case had come before [them],” those are
27 not the circumstances here. *See Smith v. Lenches*, 263 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2001). NSO
28 Defendants have incurred the litigation costs associated with their motion to dismiss (and their

1 renewed motion to dismiss) Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See Akro Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6.) That briefing process
2 involved supplemental briefing, administrative motions, and a specially negotiated protective
3 order. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 6.) NSO has also answered Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 89), prepared for and
4 attended two case management conferences, served initial disclosures, responded to written
5 discovery, and prepared written discovery of their own. (Akro Decl. ¶¶ 7–10.) Defendants have
6 also undertaken steps to preserve data. (*Id.* ¶ 11.) Were it not for the Complaint that Apple now
7 seeks to dismiss, those actions would not have been undertaken or those costs incurred.

8 In *Ardalan v. McHugh*, No. 13-CV-01138, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64812 (N.D. Cal. May
9 15, 2015), the Court found dismissal with prejudice to be warranted when the case, as here, had
10 been pending for over two years and had gone through multiple rounds of motions to dismiss. The
11 Court found that dismissal without prejudice would “return [the Defendant] to square one in this
12 litigation despite substantial time and expense spent defending against this action.” *Id.* at *4.
13 There, as here, the defendant “expended substantial energy [] in an attempt to move th[e] case
14 toward final resolution.” *Id.* at *3. Here, dismissal without prejudice “would be unfair,” since
15 Apple “could use what [it] learned during the litigation, file [its] claim again, and force the
16 defendant[s] back into litigation. See *Columbia Cas. Co. v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.*, No. 09-CV-
17 05441-LHK, 2010 WL 4591977, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2010).

18 Furthermore, Apple’s stated reasons for seeking dismissal underscore a lack of diligence
19 in filing its Complaint in the first instance. Apple claims that the disclosure requirements inherent
20 in litigation would undermine its security protections. (See Mot. at 2.) Apple acknowledges that
21 when it filed this lawsuit, “it understood that it would involve disclosure of information to third
22 parties,” yet maintains that such disclosure is now a basis for voluntary dismissal without
23 prejudice. (*Id.*) Apple offers no explanation of how it, or any other party to any federal court
24 lawsuit, could comply with court orders or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without disclosing
25 its relevant information. (See *id.*) Additionally, Apple has taken almost no steps to prosecute this
26 matter, even since the stay was lifted a year and a half ago. It has essentially served one set of
27 document requests, one set of interrogatories, and never sought to meet and confer about NSO’s
28 objections and responses. (See Akro Decl. ¶ 9.) If Apple is unwilling or unable meaningfully to

1 participate in the discovery process, as would be required in any subsequent lawsuit, then dismissal
2 without prejudice is unwarranted.

3 Finally, Apple gives three insufficient explanations for why this case should be dismissed
4 without prejudice. (Mot. 2–3.) First, as mentioned above, Apple claims that continuing the lawsuit
5 it initiated would render its information vulnerable to exploitation by third parties. This
6 explanation is insufficient to warrant dismissal without prejudice because, as Apple is aware, the
7 exchange of information in discovery is simply a requirement in civil litigation in the United States.

8 Second, Apple argues that companies unaffiliated with Defendants threaten Apple’s
9 security and that “even total victory in this suit” would not resolve its issues. (Mot. 2.) Short of
10 filing a defendant-class action (which would be inappropriate here for countless reasons), this
11 limitation is inherent in civil litigation. There is always a possibility that additional participants
12 may enter a particular market; this was true at the time Apple filed suit and Apple identifies no
13 particular recent market entrants giving rise to its concern. This explanation provides no basis for
14 dismissing the case without prejudice.

15 Third, Apple implies that Defendants or their counsel have engaged in discovery
16 misconduct, including allowing material produced by WhatsApp and Facebook in separate
17 litigation to be made public. (Mot. 1:21-23, 2:8-21.) Despite this innuendo, which has been
18 breathlessly repeated by the media, there has never been any suggestion by anyone (save Apple
19 here) that any information belonging to any litigant/producing party has ever been shared with or
20 leaked to anybody not entitled to receive it under the applicable protective order. Neither
21 Defendants nor their counsel have shared with anyone not allowed to receive it any confidential
22 information belonging to a producing party—nor has any such information been otherwise
23 “leaked.” Pointing to an article that suggests Israeli governmental actions concerning seizure of
24 *NSO’s documents*, Apple curiously complains that *it* is at risk. *Id.* (citing Davies and
25 Kirchgaessner, *Israel Tried to Frustrate US Lawsuit Over Pegasus Spyware, Leak Suggests*, The
26 *Guardian* (July 25, 2024), <https://tinyurl.com/yn58f48p>, “*Guardian* article”). But the *Guardian*
27 article asserts that material purportedly seized by Israel includes only documents internal to
28 Defendants, *not* WhatsApp or Facebook (or any other producing party). Nobody has ever claimed

1 that any information confidential to Apple or any other NSO adversary has been disclosed or
2 leaked, and Apple irresponsibly suggests that NSO, its counsel, or anyone else would fail to
3 preserve the security of Apple’s confidential material.

4 ***If the Court Dismisses Without Prejudice, It Should Impose Conditions on the Dismissal***

5 NSO Defendants do not seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs if the Court dismisses
6 the case *with* prejudice. If the Court were to dismiss the case *without* prejudice, however, NSO
7 should be awarded certain of the costs and fees associated with litigating Apple’s claims. *See*
8 *Bernacki v. Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc.*, No. 5:13-CV-02140-EJD, 2014 WL 3090815,
9 at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) (“As Plaintiff is benefitting from the court’s denial of costs, it would
10 be inequitable to allow Plaintiff to bring the action again.”); *Koby v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc.*, 2018
11 WL 1441340, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (same). Conditioning dismissal without prejudice
12 “on the plaintiff’s payment of the defendant’s costs of litigation” is “not uncommon.” *Smith-*
13 *Dickerson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Inc.*, No. 18-CV-00189-EMC, 2018 WL 3730464, at
14 *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018); *see, e.g., Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.*, 679 F.2d 143,
15 136 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming dismissal with costs as condition); *Telegram Messenger Inc. v.*
16 *Lantah, LLC*, 2020 WL 6415506, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2020) (defendant awarded fees and
17 costs as condition of dismissal); *Gonzalez v. Proctor & Gamble Co.*, 2008 WL 612746, at *4 (S.D.
18 Cal. Mar. 4, 2008) (same).

19 Courts often award attorneys’ fees and costs when granting voluntary dismissal without
20 prejudice in order “to compensate the defendant for the unnecessary expense that the litigation has
21 caused.” *Smith-Dickerson*, 2018 WL 3730464, at *2 (quoting *Cauley v. Wilson*, 754 F.2d 769,
22 772 (7th Cir. 1985).) Here, defendants have incurred litigation expenses for “work which cannot
23 be used in any future litigation of [Apple’s] claims.” *Westlands Water Dist. v. United States*, 100
24 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996).

25 For instance, by Apple’s own admission, “even complete victory in this suit will no longer
26 have the same impact” as it had initially hoped. (Mot. 2.) By this logic, it is unlikely that Apple
27 would bring an identical complaint against NSO in the future, rendering NSO’s work in answering
28 the Complaint (Dkt. No. 89) unusable. NSO Defendants have also briefed two motions to dismiss

1 the current Complaint, the second of which included supplemental briefing, multiple
 2 administrative motions, and a specially negotiated protective order. (*See* Akro Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6.) NSO
 3 also negotiated Case Management Statements, prepared for two Case Management Conferences,
 4 undertook data preservation efforts specific to Apple’s claims, prepared initial disclosures,
 5 responded to Apple’s discovery requests, and prepared its own discovery requests based on the
 6 claims asserted by Apple. (*See id.* ¶¶ 5, 8–11.) Little, if any, of this work can be repurposed for
 7 future litigation, particularly if the future claims involve different allegations and different time
 8 periods. Accordingly, in the event this case is dismissed without prejudice, Apple should pay
 9 NSO’s reasonable costs and fees “to compensate the defendant[s] for the unnecessary expense that
 10 the litigation has caused.” *Smith-Dickerson*, 2018 WL 3730464, at *2. *See Telegram*, 2020 WL
 11 5074399, at *5 (awarding fees as a condition of dismissal without prejudice even when the
 12 “litigation has not progressed to a meaningful extent toward trial and the parties have conducted
 13 very limited discovery”).

14 As a result, if the Court dismisses this case without prejudice, NSO requests that the Court
 15 “direct the parties to meet and confer regarding an appropriate award of fees and costs” that Apple
 16 should pay NSO. *See Telegram*, 2020 WL 5074399, at *5 (citing *Koch v. Hankins*, 8 F.3d 650,
 17 652 (9th Cir. 1993).) NSO has incurred unnecessary costs in this case for work that it cannot use
 18 in future litigation of Apple’s claims and is thus entitled to just compensation.

19 **IV. CONCLUSION**

20 For the foregoing reasons, NSO does not oppose Apple’s request to dismiss its Complaint.
 21 NSO does request, however, that the dismissal be *with* prejudice. In the alternative, if the Court is
 22 not inclined to dismiss Apple’s claims with prejudice and intends to dismiss *without* prejudice, it
 23 should condition any dismissal without prejudice on Apple paying NSO’s costs and fees. In that
 24 case, the parties should be directed to confer and attempt to agree on which of NSO’s fees were
 25 unnecessarily incurred and could not be used in future litigation of Apple’s claims.

26 DATED: September 27, 2024

By: /s/ Joseph N. Akrotirianakis

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